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Introduction: What Is Life? 
I’m not going to answer this question. In fact, I doubt if 
it will ever be possible to give a full answer. (Haldane, 
1949: 58)  
 
What Is Life?  
 
J. B. S. Haldane (1949) and Erwin Schrödinger (1944), 
two of the twentieth century’s most influential 
scientists, posed the direct question, ‘what is life?’ and 
declared that it was a question unlikely to find an 
answer. Life, they suggested, might exceed the ability 
of science to represent it and even though the sciences 
of biology, physics and chemistry might usefully 
describe life’s structures, systems and processes, those 
sciences should not seek to reduce it to the sum of its 
parts. While Schrödinger drew attention to the physical 
structure of living matter, including especially the cell, 
Haldane asserted that ‘what is common to life is the 
chemical events’ (1949: 59) and so therefore life might 
be defined, though not reduced, to ‘a pattern of 
chemical processes’ (62) involving the use of oxygen, 
enzymes and so on.  
 
Following Schrödinger and Haldane, Chris McKay’s 
article, published in 2004 and included in this 
collection, asks again ‘What is Life – and How Do We 
Search For It in Other Worlds?’. For him, the still open 
and unresolved question of life is intrinsically linked to 
the problem of how to find it (here, or elsewhere) since, 
he queries, how can we search for something that we 
cannot adequately define? It should be noted that this 
dilemma did not deter the founders of Artificial Life, a 
project that succeeded Artificial Intelligence and that 
sought to both simulate ‘life-as-we-know-it’ and 
synthesise ‘life-as-it-could-be’ by reducing life to the 
informational and therefore computational criteria of 
self-organisation, self-replication, evolution, autonomy 
and emergence (Langton, 1996: 40; Kember, 2003). 
McKay concedes that certain characteristics of life, such 
as metabolism and motion, can occur without biology, 
but rather than pursuing contestable (re)definitions of 
life that could not, for him, constitute the basis for a 
search, he prefers to ask a more pragmatic question: 
‘what does life need?’. The elements that support life – 
energy, carbon, liquid water, nitrogen, sulphur and 
phosphorus – are not contested and, barring only liquid 
water, they are abundant in the Solar System. It seems 
logical then, McKay argues, to search for life indirectly, 
by looking at where the water is. The case for liquid 
water on Mars has, as we will see, a long and 
argumentative history. In as far as the current case is, 
as McKay maintains, ‘tight’, then there is justification 
for his upbeat assessment that, with the correct 
instruments, it should be possible to find life-as-we-
know-it – and even life-as-it-could-be. He writes: ‘while 
it could be similar at the top (ecological) and bottom 
(chemical) levels, life on Mars could be quite alien in 
the middle, in the realm of biochemistry’ (2004: 1261).  
 
The tone of Zhuralev and Avetisovs’ (2006) article on 
‘The definition of life in the context of its origin’ is 
somewhat downbeat in comparison with McKay’s. Life 
is too complex and diverse to define, they argue, and 
our understanding of it is poor. They offer a very useful 
overview of historical variations in the definition of life, 
ranging from Darwin’s sense of life as a system that 
evolves by means of natural selection to more recent 
informational and ecological definitions. What is 
interesting about their argument – aside from a critical 
philosophical inclination that is often lacking elsewhere 
– is the extent to which they reject the view of life as 
information; a view that has characterised the 
technosciences since the discovery of DNA in the 1950s 
and that is derived, they suggest, from Shannon and 
Weavers’ post-war Information Theory. As a defining 
characteristic of life, information is ‘often reduced to 
storage and the expression of genetic information (2006: 
281). Yet, for Zhuralev and Avetisov, information is 
likely to be far more complex than this. However, a 
more complex account of information as a factor of 
biological processes, structures and states is not 
currently available. I have argued elsewhere (2003) 
that the informational approach to life has long been 
contested within biology and computer science. In The 
Darwin Wars (1999), for example, Andrew Brown 
contrasts information-based genetic determinism 
(Richard Dawkin’s view of life as the expression of our 
selfish genes) with the argument that the fundamental 
unit of life is in fact not the gene, but rather the 
individual organism – albeit one that receives and feeds 
back information to its own internal environment, and 
to the external one too. If the always contestable view of 
life as a (cybernetic) information processing system is, 
to an extent, unavoidable for Zhuralev and Avetisov, 
their own attempt at a contingent description puts 
information into play with the materiality that 
Shannon and Weaver sought to elide (Hayles, 1999). 
Combining states with processes, it undermines the 
autonomy of both the individual agent/organism and 
the abstract informational or ecological system within 
which such an agent/organism supposedly resides.  
 
From Exo- to Astrobiology  
 
If ideas about complexity, heterogeneity and even 
relationality arise in Zhuralev and Avetisovs’ ‘doomed’ 
quest for an adequate definition of life, they are notably 
absent in the fields of exobiology and astrobiology, 
which connect the question of life with the problem of 
finding it ‘out there’. Exobiology and astrobiology are 
effectively synonyms, but Stefan Helmreich explains 
how and when (in 1998) astrobiology ‘became a 
favoured designation for the study of cosmic biology 
when NASA founded its Astrobiology Institute’ (2006: 
68). On its webpage, NASA defines astrobiology as ‘the 
study of the origin, evolution, distribution and future of 
life in the universe’. It is further described as a 
multidisciplinary field that encompasses ‘the search for 
habitable environments in our Solar System and 
habitable planets outside our Solar System’ as well as 
‘the search for evidence of prebiotic chemistry and life 
on Mars and other bodies in our Solar System, 
laboratory and field research into the origins and early 
evolution of life on Earth, and studies of the potential 
for life to adapt to challenges on Earth and in space’ 
(http://astrobiology.nasa.gov). This definition 
encompasses the recent study of extremophiles, or 
organisms that live in environments previously 
considered uninhabitable due to extreme temperature, 
lack of oxygen and so on. It hints at the possibilities of 
terraforming – of recreating human societies on other 
planets, including Mars – and has, at its core, the long-
held assumption of an analogy between Earth and 
Mars.  
 
The analogy between Earth and Mars is explored at 
length in Percival Lowell’s books on Mars, spanning the 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth century, and 
included in this living book because of their widely 
acknowledged influence on the development of exo- and 
astrobiology, and, indeed, due to their direct relation to 
nineteenth- and twentieth century science-fiction 
(Markley, 2005). In The War of the Worlds, published 
just a few years after Lowell’s Mars, H.G. Wells refers 
to the nebular hypothesis, a theory of planetary 
formation initially suggested by Immanuel Kant and 
Pierre Simon Laplace that is the basis of Lowell’s 
argument for the existence of intelligent life on Mars. 
The nebular hypothesis maintains that planets were 
formed by condensed gas rings emitted from the Sun. 
The rate of cooling and subsequent habitability of the 
planets was determined by their respective size and 
distance from the Sun. Since Mars is both smaller than 
Earth and further from the Sun, it is, according to this 
hypothesis, ‘older than our world; and long before this 
earth ceased to be molten, life upon its surface must 
have begun its course’ (Wells, 1898: 1-2). For Lowell 
and Wells, the basis of the analogy between Earth and 
Mars is not simply that the two planets are neighbours, 
but that one is an older and therefore more evolved 
version of the other. It is, at this stage, a temporal 
analogy, which, through subsequent debates, 
observations and explorations of Mars – particularly in 
the 1960s – becomes also a spatial analogy. The latter 
is premised on the opposition of Earth and Mars as, 
respectively, the blue planet and the red planet (that is, 
when viewed from space); the live planet and the dead 
one. It is my contention that this doppelgänger phase of 
the relation between Earth and Mars is nearing its end 
– an end signalled by Gilbert Levin’s findings in the 
Viking Labelled Release experiment of 1976 and 
accelerated by the confirmation of Lowell’s concerns 
about the sustainability of life on Earth. The two 
articles included here from the journal Sustainability 
demonstrate, I suggest, a continued allegiance to 
Lowell’s thinking and a return to the earlier temporal 
analogy in which Mars stands, once again, for the 
future of life on Earth.  
 
Astrobiology’s analogies are of course premised on a 
belief in the autonomy of Earth and Mars, humans and 
aliens, and in their subsequent ability to interact with 
each other. The notion of panspermia – i.e., meteor-
bound microbes travelling between planets and linking 
their respective origins and evolution – underlies 
astrobiology, as does the representationalism that 
allows a life form to be substituted or evidenced by its 
biochemical signature. Representationalism, as Karen 
Barad (2007) suggests, is premised on the autonomy of 
the thing and its trace; an autonomy which allows for 
the latter to be (as it were, by itself) more or less 
reliable, more or less accurate in its description of an 
object or being whose absence is therefore made 
present. In his article, ‘The Signature of Life: Designing 
the Astrobiological Imagination’, Helmreich reminds us 
that for Derrida (in ‘Signature Event Context’) the 
representational link is broken and that the signature 
has, in effect, no signer. Helmreich writes: ‘the 
signature of life can exist only insofar as life itself is a 
replicable absence, a metaphysical quality we know 
when we don’t see it’ (2006: 73). Life itself, for Foucault, 
is precisely a metaphysical quality – it is not only a 
construct but a kind of construct that did not even exist 
before the end of the eighteenth century. In the 
transition from natural history to biology and from the 
study of living beings to the study of life itself there is, 
Foucault suggests, a process of splitting and separation 
in which life and being become exterior to each other. 
Life, he argues, ‘on the confines of being, is what is 
exterior to it and also, at the same time, what manifests 
itself within it’ (1997: 264). The idea of life as an 
inexhaustible force which passes through but surpasses 
being informs the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson 
(1998). It is significant in this context that life for 
Bergson, associated as it is more with processes than 
states, more with becoming than being, remains 
resolutely unrepresentable.  
 
Biosignatures are generated by biochemical processes 
such as the acquisition and conversion of energy, and 
are sought in the chemical ingredients, and even in the 
elements needed for life, notably water – but also, more 
recently, sulphur and methane. Drawing on the work of 
Hillel Schwartz, Helmreich considers the ‘de-signs’ or, 
to use Derrida’s terms, ‘dissentions’ – the internal 
revolutions – at play within astrobiology (Helmreich, 
2006: 75; Derrida, 1978: 38). He asks: ‘Within the 
biosignatures astrobiologists employ – or, better, design 
– as evidence for life, do there lurk logics of de-sign? 
That is, having installed a representational system for 
detecting direct and remote signs of life, might 
astrobiologists also be curving away from this system, 
from these signs?’ (76). The signs of de-sign exist, for 
example, in the recognition of the limitations of 
terrestrial analogies for extraterrestrial life, in the 
acknowledged but necessary reduction of life to its 
states, structures and processes and in contestations 
over visual evidence and the interpretation of data. 
Astrobiology’s internal revolutions are what make and 
unmake the field. They extend from Lowell to Levin 
and beyond, and they incorporate key events such as 
the claim, in 1996, that a team led by David McKay 
‘had discovered traces of biogenic materials and 
possibly of fossil microorganisms within ALH84001, a 
1.9kg meteorite of Martian origin’ (Taylor, 2001: 3). The 
Mariner 4 flyby of 1964 had dealt ‘the final blow to the 
concept of Mars as an Earth-like and potentially life-
bearing world’. Although the Martian meteorite 
demonstrated the continued desire for extant life of 
Mars, it revealed, at best, extinct life (13). The 
fossilised organisms onboard the meteorite were more 
virus-sized than bacterial and therefore a little short of 
qualifying as life forms. It was also suggested that the 
microbe-like structures were ‘more likely to be artefacts 
arising from the preparation of fractured crystalline 
materials for examination by stereoscan electron-
microscopy’ (4).  
 
The history of astrobiology is entangled with the history 
of technologies, from telescopes to microscopes via 
photography and spectrography. Although the 
trajectory from Lowell’s observatory in Flagstaff 
Arizona to the onboard cameras of Spirit and 
Opportunity (NASA’s robots, roving Mars since 2004) 
has involved moving ever closer to the object in 
question (life on Mars, past or present), the history of 
Mars technology has not been one of unquestioned 
progress, since the object has never been successfully 
disentangled from its mode of observation. The de-signs 
of astrobiology are more marked than those of other 
sciences because its object is ultimately elusive and its 
methods so variable. In his paper addressing historical 
perspectives on the question of life on Mars, Taylor 
shows how, between the late nineteenth century and 
the early twenty-first century, the ‘pendulum of 
scientific opinion’ swung from the claim that there must 
be intelligent life on Mars, to the claim that there was 
no life at all, back to the possibility of microbial life, 
albeit in the past (2001: 14). This pendulum dynamic 
followed the use of different diagnostic instruments. 
The technological and contextual contingency of 
scientific claims extends, of course, to the design and 
execution of experiments – including, especially, the 
Viking experiments of the 1970s as one of the most 
contested of all. Viking 1 landed on Mars in 1976. It 
contained three different experiments designed to 
search for biochemical signatures ‘consistent with the 
presence of life’ (15). Robert Markley, in his 
comprehensive study of the science and culture of the 
Dying Planet, maintains that each experiment was 
limited by an unavoidable terracentrism, based on an 
analogy between life on Earth and life on Mars which 
defines and constrains both the popular and scientific 
imagination. He argues that the principal investigators 
‘acknowledged that they were operating from terrestrial 
expectations about how alien microbes might respond to 
water, nutrients, heat and light’ and that their 
experiments ‘encoded different views about how such 
hypothesized life might metabolize nutrients and 
respond to environmental stimuli’ (2005: 244). Taylor 
adds to this the perhaps contentious note that ‘prior to 
the actual spacecraft landings, the opinions of the three 
individuals responsible for each of the active-biology 
experiments ranged from optimism regarding the 
discovery of life (Gilbert Levin), a cautious 50/50 chance 
expectation (Vince Oyama), to complete pessimism 
(Norman Horowitz)’. Not only were their views largely 
unchanged once the data was analysed, he maintains, 
‘they have remained unchanged right down to the 
present day’ (15).  
 
Within the broad field of astrobiology, both analogical 
and representational reasoning are continually 
designed, de-signed and – as we will see by following 
the trajectory of both Lowell and Levins’ work – re-
designed. The question that remains, and may always 
remain, pertains to the possibility of extant or even 
extinct life on Mars that is sufficiently disentangled 
from extant (or even extinct) knowledge and 
preconception; techniques, technologies and values 
characteristic of life here on Earth. If alien life is truly 
alien, how do we recognise it? These questions, I 
suggest, become clearer if we switch registers from 
science to philosophy, or at least relinquish, rather than 
attempt to recover, the designs of representation and 
the presumed autonomies that underline analogical 
thought. However, two recent articles from the journal 
Sustainability show that these designs are far from 
relinquished and, indeed, as I indicated earlier, take us 
back to nineteenth century analogical thought in which 
the futures of Earth and Mars are intertwined. Pabulo 
Henrique Rampelotto’s article considers what the 
continued ‘discovery’ (presuming as this term does the 
disentanglement of object from its mode of observation) 
of terran extremophiles offers to the field of 
astrobiology – which, in short, is the hope of extant life 
on Mars. Microbes, he maintains, ‘can return to life 
even after hundreds of millions of years’ and so there is 
the possibility, given that Mars once had an 
environment like ours, that ‘life could have survived 
and adapted to the subsurface conditions’ (2010: 1609). 
If life can be found under a rock in the Atacama desert, 
then why, Rampelotto asks, can’t it be found on Mars? 
The list of known extremophiles is exhausting 
(thermophiles, psychrophiles, halophiles, acidophiles, 
alkaliphiles….) but not exhaustive. Life is just not as 
sensitive as we once thought. It can do without light 
and even oxygen – though not, as Lowell always said, 
without water.  
 
If Rampelotto’s article looks from Earth toward Mars – 
an ageing planet that Lowell said was populated by a 
superior race of nevertheless doomed and dying 
Martians – Seth Baum’s contribution to Sustainability, 
and to this collection, returns the gaze and asks: ‘Is 
Humanity Doomed?’. Happily, he believes that our fate 
is not so certain. Baum does not share the 
environmental determinism that drove Lowell’s theory 
of planetology, and he is equivocal about Lowell’s sense 
of Mars as a prophet, ‘foretelling our future’ (Lowell, 
1908: 111). Planetology is Lowell’s attempt to reconcile 
the nebular hypothesis with Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. He argues, in Mars as the Abode of Life, that 
there are six stages to a planet’s evolution, taking it 
from birth to death. Earth is at stage 4 (terraqueous), 
while Mars is at stage 5 (terrestrial – the ‘oceans have 
departed’) and the Moon is dead at stage 6 (1908: 11). 
By virtue of being older than Earth in evolutionary 
terms, Mars indicates a future already foretold in the 
‘expansion of Earth’s deserts’ (135) – and, I might add, 
in the melting of its polar ice-caps. Environmental 
determinism may drive the ‘Goldilocks principle’ of 
astrobiology (the idea of habitable zones that are ‘just 
right’ for life), but Baum suggests that it is undermined 
by insights gleaned from extremophiles on Earth. He 
ponders the Fermi paradox – which suggests that 
logically, mathematically, there should be alien life in 
abundance even though we have, arguably, failed to 
detect it – and eschews Eschatology, or end of the world 
scenarios such as the impact event(s) that did for the 
dinosaurs. True, he says, our Sun will one day collapse, 
but since other disasters (for example, climate and 
ecological ones) are far more imminent, the question of 
sustainability remains valid – and, indeed, vital. Since 
sustainability, for Baum, is a fundamentally ethical (as 
much as environmental) issue (see also Braidotti, 2006) 
that might enable humans to avoid the fate of Lowell’s 
Martians – who are doomed, despite their canal-
building efforts, to drying out – his conclusions are 
surprising. As if Lowell had morphed into Wells in his 
imagination, Baum suggests that our efforts to render 
our planet sustainable are only a means of buying time, 
‘so that future generations can colonize space’ (2010: 
600). Like Well’s Martian invaders – driven from their 
own planet to colonize and consume the inhabitants of 
Earth – it looks likely that we may have to move out 
after all.  
 
Mars and Martians 
 
The pairings that structure the chapters in this book 
are analogues or doubles. They contain texts that 
appear to be autonomous but are, I suggest, co-
constitutive of each other, even as the boundary cuts 
are made between science and fiction, Earth and Mars, 
humans and aliens. Cuts, according to Barad: ‘cut 
‘things’ together and apart’ (2007: 179). She adds that 
‘what lies on the other side of the agential cut is not 
separate from us’ (393) and therefore the challenge, 
ethically, is not how we do or don’t, should or shouldn’t 
respond to radical alterity, but rather, what is the 
degree to which we are prepared to recognise our 
entanglement with others – with the alien as the 
ultimate other, with Mars as a planet that co-evolves 
with Earth in the Solar System. If the human condition 
is one of becoming-with aliens (as well as technologies, 
animals and so on) and the condition of Earth is one of 
becoming-with Mars (among other objects in the Solar 
System), we retain, according to the psychoanalyst 
Melanie Klein, a psychological tendency (which for me 
is also strongly cultural) to deny, or at least to defer, 
the recognition of our connectivity with seemingly 
exterior entities. Klein (1988) writes about the early 
development of infants, and about the anxiety that can 
be generated by separation – from the Mother as the 
original object of love and hate – and the frustration of 
bodily needs. That anxiety produces what she calls the 
paranoid/schizoid tendency, whereby good and bad 
feelings about the object are externalised, split and 
projected onto it. The object thereby becomes 
persecutory, and the subject becomes paranoid. 
Although the development process is by no means 
linear, it is not until those mixed feelings are 
synthesised internally that the infant moves into the 
phase of depressive anxiety, or greater psychic realism. 
There are, I suggest, many cultural manifestations, 
perhaps particular to the West (and its tendency, as 
Levi Strauss [1978] maintains, to think in binary 
oppositions), of our arrested, or at least non-linear 
development. Not least of these is our relation to Mars 
and Martians – a relation from which, it seems to me, 
we have endured a difficult separation, and through 
which we act out, in science as in the imagination, the 
frustration of our bodily-environmental needs. Indeed, 
our relation to Mars and Martians is, to say the least, a 
highly anxious one. Where – in fantasies of 
terraforming, or of intelligent and heroic canal-building 
aliens – it is clear that we idealise the planet and its 
inhabitants (from whom we may or may not have 
originated, and into whom we may or may not evolve), 
it is also apparent that we fear the sort of persecution 
that so far only our species has been proven to conduct. 
This, of course, is the subtext of War of the Worlds, 
which exemplifies and exposes the paranoid projections 
of Western cultural imperialism, embodying them in 
monstrous, destructive, vampiric Martian-machines. 
On a note of pure speculation, I cannot help but wonder 
if a relatively stable era or phase of psychic realism will 
not be achieved until or unless we find – dead or alive – 
the first Martian microbe whose existence is not 
disputed and which is, if not strictly analogous, then at 
least related to our own. Our relationality with aliens, 
in other words, may need to be spelled out.  
 
In the meantime splitting remains the sign of anxious 
agential connection. It is the bio/psycho/cultural 
signature of human-alien, co-dependent and co-
constitutive life forms that may remain forever 
unrepresentable (or absent, in Derrida’s sense), but 
that are nevertheless becoming (in Bergson’s sense). 
Which is to say that human-aliens exist (as I argue in 
the epilogue) more as time than in space. Time, for 
Bergson (1998), is a synonym for movement, duration, 
creative evolution – and life itself. Human-aliens are a 
facet of what Barad (2007) refers to as the dynamic 
intra-actions of entities that appear separate and 
merely interactive. Bergson, before her, insisted that 
our eyes deceive us, and that we see only states, not 
processes. For me, these dynamic intra-actions also 
connect science and fiction; Percival Lowell and his 
detractors, such as Alfred Russell Wallace, without 
whom Lowell would not have written his later work; 
and also Gilbert Levin and his NASA-backed 
detractors, who have contributed to keeping alive a 
claim (of some 35 years and counting) that Mars is both 
habitable and inhabited. The pairing of texts in this 
living book as either analogues or doubles is therefore 
ironic, although it does demonstrate the pendulum 
dynamic of debates on Mars, and the extent to which 
these are structured by a dispute over the nature of 
scientific knowledge and, specifically, the relation 
between observation and deduction, and between data 
and interpretation. Debates on Mars and Martians in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century do not 
simply contribute to the production of science-fiction, I 
maintain, but rather generate within themselves 
fictional and narrative tropes. They are stories 
involving compelling, un/reliable narrators; strong and 
sometimes obsessive characters; antagonism; a sense of 
crisis and a quest for resolution (see McKee [1999] for 
an outline of the characteristics of story-telling). What 
is more, although other commentators, such as Markley 
(2005), have shown the extent to which scientific 
debates remain porous, and are literally in-formed by 
the knowledge, technologies and values of their time, I 
would want to go further. In this book, I incorporate 
texts that span the interval from 1895 to 2011: I 
include, among others, the pairing of Lowell’s Mars 
with Wells’ War of the Worlds; Lowell’s Mars and Its 
Canals with Wallace’s Is Mars Habitable?, and Lowell’s 
Mars as the Abode of Life with Levin’s most recent 
update of his landmark piece, co-authored with Patricia 
Ann Straat and entitled ‘Life on Mars? The Viking 
Labeled Release Experiment’ (included here as ‘The 
Labeled Release Experiment – Past and Future’). In 
doing this, I seek to reflect and enact not so much the 
porosity of science with relation to the social, but first of 
all the production of a technoscientific culture of 
inextricable fact and fiction, in which aliens always 
already exist.  
 
I will not offer a summary of Lowell’s books beyond the 
points that have already been highlighted; those that 
will be mentioned in the next section of the introduction 
concern method and the disputed nature of scientific 
knowledge. It is precisely in the protracted self-defence 
of his science of Mars and Martians that Lowell 
establishes himself as an un/reliable narrator and an 
increasingly obsessive character, engaged in an 
antagonistic debate whose narrative crisis appears at 
the end of Mars and is resolved thirteen years later, at 
the end of Mars as the Abode of Life. The crisis, outlined 
by Lowell, and extended by Wells, concerns not so much 
the existence of beings on Mars, or even the biological, 
chemical and physical characteristics of Martian life 
itself. As Lowell puts it: ‘That Mars seems to be 
inhabited is not the last, but the first word on the 
subject. More important than the mere fact of the 
existence of living beings there, is the question of what 
they may be like’ (1895: 211). The crisis, then, concerns 
the character of the Martians; one that Lowell tends to 
idealise as superior in intelligence to us and more 
egalitarian (the canals spread across the entire planet 
to the benefit of all, and not just of those living in the 
relatively terraqueous poles), while Wells demonises it 
as excessively imperialist. Between them, they cover 
the spectrum of what Klein calls the paranoid/schizoid 
phase, in which anxiety (about the primary object) is 
felt as a fear of annihilation. Lowell foretells the 
annihilation of life on Earth as the planet moves 
inexorably through the evolutionary phases of its 
development. His books are, among other things, a 
series of projections in which the fate of Earth and 
Earthlings is played on Mars and Martians. This 
intelligent and socially-minded race of superior beings 
is doomed and dying. The crisis – and the tension – is 
resolved by his conclusion, at the end of his writing, 
that very soon this race will be dead. For Wells, the 
crisis of annihilating invaders is resolved by means of 
an annihilating invasion: the Martians are killed off by 
alien-human bacteria.  
 
In recent decades, the scientific imagination has been 
organised around the prospect of Martians as- rather 
than Martians-with microbes. In this respect, the work 
of Gilbert Levin stands out as both a successor to that 
of Percival Lowell (maintaining, against a concerted 
and powerful opposition, the case for extant life) and as 
the clearest and most consistent articulation of a 
position towards which the pendulum of scientific 
opinion is swinging – albeit despite itself – as Mars 
begins, once again, to look habitable. In ‘The Labeled 
Release Experiment – Past and Future’ (written in 
2011 and published here for the first time), he offers a 
retrospective analysis of the data and contested 
interpretations of his original findings in the 1970s. 
Then, in his paper with Straat, Levin concluded that 
although his findings were consistent with life, it was 
possible that ‘non-terrestrial soil chemistry may be 
mimicking a biological response’ (1977). His 
interpretation was cautious, he suggests in retrospect, 
‘because of the great significance of finding 
extraterrestrial life’ (2011: 10). However, subsequent to 
the other two Viking experiments conducted by Oyama 
and Horowitz, it became the basis of the dominant 
view, sanctioned within the scientific community as a 
whole. Taylor offers a summary of the labeled release, 
gas exchange and carbon assimilation experiments, all 
designed to detect metabolic activity using different 
methods. While ‘Levin and Oyama’s experiments 
sought to detect life by the decomposition of organic 
nutrients into gas during metabolism’, Horowitz’s 
experiment ‘was based on an initial synthesis of organic 
matter that would incorporate the labelled atmospheric 
gases supplied’ (2001: 15). Even though, according to 
Taylor, two out of the three experiments ‘appeared to 
indicate a positive result’ for biological activity, doubts 
arose concerning the existence of organic molecules on 
Mars and, prior to NASA ending its biological 
experimentation programme in 1977, the general 
opinion was that the results were either non-biological, 
or simply too ambiguous (15). For Levin, this ambiguity 
called for further controls and experiments, which he 
continues to conduct and design to this day. His aim, 
still, is to eliminate the possibility of a non-biological 
interpretation of the Viking data – that, he maintains, 
was never in itself contested. ‘The disagreement’, he 
writes, ‘is about the interpretation – for life or not – of 
the data’ (2011: 2).  
 
Looking back over decades of disagreement, Levin now 
argues that, since his experiment ‘satisfied the pre-
mission criteria for the discovery of microbial life’, there 
should have been an official follow-up, instead of which 
NASA and ESA merely presumed that the reaction 
generated by the labelled release experiment ‘was 
caused by a strong oxidant in the surface material of 
Mars’ (2). Since, for him, an interpretation based on the 
presence of oxidants is inconsistent with the data, and, 
having reviewed this in the light of subsequent 
research on extremophiles and the Martian 
environment, Levin is able to conclude that not only is 
it ‘more difficult to imagine a sterile Mars than a live 
one’, but that he did indeed find life (24). In a context in 
which the Goldilocks principle of habitats that are just 
right for life has been reassessed as a – perhaps – more 
Kleinian, depressive principle of not ideal but good 
enough, Levin is able to argue that it is now ‘extremely 
difficult to deny that liquid water in amounts sufficient 
for microbial activity exists at the Viking landing sites 
and over broad areas of Mars’ (18). The ‘concept of Mars 
as a habitat’ has indeed ‘changed radically’; in effect, it 
has changed back from Wallace’s claim that it is dry, 
uninhabitable and uninhabited to Lowell’s claim that, 
although it is caught in an inevitable dialectic with 
death, there is, after all, life on Mars (18).  
 
Aliens Between Fact and Fiction – As If!  
 
From H. G. Wells (1898) to Orson Welles (1938), and 
from The Greening of Mars (1984) to District 9 (2009), 
there has been a tradition of writing about Mars and 
Martians that hovers between fact and fiction, 
presenting stories as if they were documents of events. 
Looking back at my own work, the concept of ‘as if’ has 
been associated with metaphor and the creation of 
associations between unlike entities, such as humans 
and machines, monsters or, indeed, aliens (Kember, 
1998). Recently, however, I have revised my 
interpretation and associated the ‘as if’ concept more 
with metamorphosis than metaphor, and with the 
becomings attendant upon connections that always 
already exist (Kember, 2011). This interpretation is 
more consistent with Foucault (1997) – and, following 
him, with Braidotti’s (2002) sense of the potentiality of 
between-space, as well as with Haraway (2008) and 
then Barad’s (2007) reading of the intra-actions 
between companion species. I want to insist then on the 
companionate relationality not only of humans and 
aliens but of fact and fiction, of story and document. 
Being dynamic and processual, such relationality 
precludes the possibility of representationalism, and 
therefore of maintaining a division between truth and 
illusion.    W ithout relinquishing its claim  to 
representational realism, one of the many interesting 
things about Lowell’s work is the extent to which – by 
virtue of its extraordinary conclusions, and its 
proximity in time and tone with a major work of fiction 
– it explores the boundary of truth and illusion and, 
what’s more, pushes science toward an edge with art 
and (emerging) media that is policed, increasingly, in 
the name of ethics. Boundary work, as more 
contemporary science story-tellers such as Haraway 
and Barad maintain, highlights ethics not as right 
response, but as recognition and responsibility toward 
the constitutive other. For Lowell, the constitutive 
other of science is philosophy and the constitutive other 
of the scientist is the sketch-artist and the 
photographer. In the Preface toMars and its Canals, 
Lowell writes, in response to his as-yet unnamed 
detractors within the scientific community, that: 
‘Formulae are the anaesthetics of thought, not its 
stimulants; and to make anyone think is far better 
worthwhile than cramming him with ill-considered, and 
therefore indigestible learning’ (1906: ix). Along with 
this propensity to make people think, he defends his 
method, namely a ‘systematic study’ of Mars, conducted 
while using ‘a small instrument, in good air’ and 
producing many hundreds of sketches and drawings, a 
number of which are reproduced in his books as 
evidence for canals – and therefore intelligent life – on 
Mars (1895: v). The chain of evidence that leads from a 
pencil sketch to an alien species is, he claims, a logical 
deduction, strengthened by the intervention of 
photography in 1905. This, involving the use of a colour 
screen amongst various other refinements, was able to 
reproduce what Lowell already saw, including some 
canals, some seas and even ‘a snowfall’ (1906: 275). 
Photography, for Lowell, was personified as a reliable, 
trustworthy observer, albeit one limited in ability. It 
could offer a recording ‘after the fact’, meaning after the 
conjunction of draftsman/sketch-artist, instrument and 
logical deduction – all of which added up to the ethics of 
‘seeing well’ (274, 195). It is Lowell himself as the first 
observer (after Schiaparelli) of the canals, as the 
discoverer of life on Mars, who embodies the ethics of 
seeing well. This, in turn, enables him to explore the 
boundary between truth and illusion with such 
confidence that he presents his work as proof that ‘what 
reads like fiction is all the more wonderful for being 
fact’ (196). Lowell’s long reach over subsequent debates 
extends, I would suggest, to his assertion – and denial – 
of a connection between humans and aliens, fact and 
fiction, that de-centres ‘us’, that discomforted the 
conservatives of his day and that continues to enable 
later science story-tellers to do much the same.  
 
My last pair of analogue-opposites consists of the 
equally fantastic Sounds of Earth and Scrambles of 
Earth. Sounds of Earth is the golden, interstellar record 
placed aboard the Voyager spacecraft in 1977 and 
designed by NASA to represent human life aurally to 
who ever or whatever might be out there to receive it. 
Scrambles of Earth is this same record remixed by 
extraterrestrials and recorded (the CD is available on 
Amazon) on behalf of SETI-X (the Search for 
Extraterrestrial Life in Exile), a dissident off-shoot of 
the better known organisation. SETI-X suggest that 
this recording is ‘rather at odds’ with the 
anthropological and technological aspects of the original 
project, which offers, in retrospect, ‘incomplete 
recording information for much of the disc’s non-
Western music – with credit and copyright often given 
to those European and American ethnomusicologists 
who recorded “Pygmy Girls” and “Navajo Indians”, 
while the names of Bach, Mozart and Stravinsky stand 
as tokens of unitary authorship and putatively 
universal genius’ (http://earthscramble.com/). The alien 
remix is, according to SETI-X, implicitly critical of the 
original’s Eurocentrism, and evinces almost total non-
compliance with standard record speed (one rotation 
every 3.6 seconds), the distinction between sound and 
noise, copyright laws and so on. It seems to me – 
although this could very easily be a facet of my own 
preconceptions – that Scrambles of Earth does not 
display the same desire to represent alien life aurally. 
Rather, what we have here is evidence of de-sign or 
dissent; an overturning from within which suggests 
that our extraterrestrial companions do not consider 




In lieu of an end-point or conclusion to this long 
introduction, I would like to offer a brief postscript, 
which serves to reiterate my argument that debates on 
astrobiology and the quest for life on Mars are 
analogical, antagonistic and ultimately circular. In a 
recent article entitled ‘Media, Mars and 
Metamorphosis’, I discussed a remarkable open access 
electronic book edited by Jeremy Hoyle and concerning, 
amongst others, a microbiologist named Lou (surname 
withheld for legal purposes). Lou had designed an 
experiment, conducted thus far in secret, to test for 
microbial life on Mars. It is reasonable, I think, to 
deduce that the experiment was carried and performed 
by one of the Mars rovers – either Spirit or 
Opportunity. We know for a fact that the ill-fated 
Beagle 2 did include biological experiments and, with 
Levin, I find that NASA’s apparent reluctance to 
pursue life experiments literally beggars belief. Since 
Spirit has been stuck in a sand-trap for some time, 
there would certainly have been ample opportunity for 
this robot to conduct, for example, probe experiments 
into the sub-soil where liquid water is likely to be 
found, at least at certain times of the year. Lou, 
interviewed by Hoyle, and, having been fired by NASA 
and effectively released from his confidentiality 
agreement, claims to have discovered microbial life in a 
form fundamentally similar to that of green sulphur 
bacteria which form in aggregates around unicellular 
organisms – in this case, resembling E. Coli. After 
Levin and Lowell before him, Lou submitted his 
findings to peer review, but was received with 
scepticism and ultimately humiliated. He was driven to 
take extreme measures to vindicate himself, and he 
reveals to Hoyle that he ingested the microbe so that he 
himself would come to embody alien life. Hoyle is 
dismissive, and readers of this volume may discover for 
themselves just how dearly his conservatism cost him 
(Kember, 2010). That is not what I am reporting here, 
however. Rather, I have been asked to give notice of 
Lou’s intention (he is no longer speaking to Hoyle) to 
conduct a follow-up experiment – on himself. This will 
be an experiment designed to test for the presence of 
hybrid human-alien cells. I do not know, at this stage, 
whether or not they are green, but I am assured that 
evidence will be provided in the form of sketches and 
photographs as well as, of course, biochemical 
signatures. As it is the duty of the scientist to offer a 
taxonomy of life-forms, so it is the privilege of those 
who discover new life-forms to name them. Although 
Lou is still in the process of choosing a name, I can 
reveal that among those currently receiving his 
consideration is the Clathratiforme Lowevinyte, in 
homage, it would seem, to those who have influenced 
him and his field most profoundly.  
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